

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 19083 01 OF 02 271738Z

42

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 L-01 SP-02 INR-07 SAJ-01

SAM-01 PRS-01 PM-03 RSC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

NSCE-00 /048 W

----- 000379

R 271525Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5723

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 19083

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, GR, CY, TU

SUBJ: THE SOVIETS AND CYPRUS

REF: A. USUN 5966

B. USUN 5931

1. SUMMARY. SOVIET ACTIONS DURING THE UNSC DEBATE ON RENEWAL OF UNFICYP AND RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING CYPRUS-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW MAY HAVE GROWN LESS CONCERNED ABOUT TURKISH SENSITIVITIES AND LESS CAUTIOUS IN OVERTLY COURTING THE GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS. IN GEOPOLITICAL TERMS TURKEY REMAINS A MORE IMPORTANT COUNTRY THAN GREECE FOR THE USSR. THROUGHOUT THE CYPRUS CRISIS MOSCOW HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID OFFENSE TO ANKARA. BUT THIS APPROACH MAY NOW BE CHANGING. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY SEE A POLICY MORE OPENLY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 19083 01 OF 02 271738Z

SYMPATHETIC TO THE HELLENIC COMMUNITY AS STRENGTHENING EXISTING

GREEK AND GREEK CYPRIOT INCLINATIONS TO SUPPORT SOME KIND OF SOVIET ROLE IN THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME THEY SEEM TO BE APPLYING MEASURED PRESSURE ON THE TURKS, PRESENTLY FACED WITH TROUBLES AT HOME AND IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., IN AN EFFORT TO REVISE THE NEGATIVE TURKISH ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO INCREASE MOSCOW'S VOICE ABOUT CYPRUS. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE DEPARTING FROM THE EVEN-HANDED POLICY TOWARD TURKEY WHICH HAS HAD LITTLE PAYOFF SINCE IT WAS ENUNCIATED IN JULY. THE SOVIETS MAY WELL RECKON THAT THEIR BEST OPPORTUNITIES WOULD EMERGE FROM A STALEMATE IN CYPRUS OR A PARTIAL DEFUSING OF THE CRISIS THERE WHICH WOULD LEAVE ENOUGH UNRESOLVED DIFFERENCES TO ASSURE CONTINUED GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATION. WE EXPECT THAT SOVIET POLICY RELATING TO THE CYPRUS AFFAIR WILL CONTINUE TO BE REACTIVE AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONSTRAINED BY DETENTE CONSIDERATIONS AND BY THEIR BASIC STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN TURKEY. THUS WE DOUBT THAT SOVIET DIPLOMACY ON CYPRUS WILL GO BEYOND THE RELATIVELY LOW-LEVEL OF MEDDLING THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED IT SINCE LAST SUMMER.

END SUMMARY.

2. WITH MAKARIOS BACK IN CYPRUS, WITH KARAMANLIS FIRMLY IN POWER IN GREECE, AND WITH CONTINUING LACK OF MOVEMENT ON A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE STRENGTHENING THEIR IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF THE TURKS AND TO BE SHOWING LESS CONCERN ABOUT TURKISH SENSITIVITIES. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO AVOID DIRECT CRITICISM OF OR PRESSURE ON ANKARA. BUT THEY HAVE SHOWN A CLEAR WILLINGNESS TO STEP ON TURKISH TOES AT THE UN WHERE THEY GAVE TOTAL SUPPORT TO THE CYPRIOT POSITION ON THE SC RESOLUTION RENEWING THE UNFICYP MANDATE (REFTELS). A SWELLING CHORUS OF SOVIET CALLS IN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE AND IN PRESS COMMENT FOR THE EARLIEST WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM CYPRUS ALSO APPEARS PRIMARILY DIRECTED AGAINST ANKARA. THE TURKISH POLITICAL COUNSELOR HERE, IN FACT, RECENTLY TOLD US THAT, CONTRARY TO WESTERN PRESS STORIES, HE READ THE WITHDRAWAL LANGUAGE IN THE FRENCH-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE AS DIRECTED SQUARELY AT TURKEY. THE PRESS HAS ALSO CARRIED SEVERAL ARTICLES IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF ANKARA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES. MOST RECENTLY PRAVDA'S A. VASILYEV (DECEMBER 22) CHIDED THE TURKS FOR THEIR POLITICAL HAGGLING AND POINTEDLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 19083 01 OF 02 271738Z

LISTED "COLOSSAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON CYPRUS" AS ONE OF THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO TURKEY'S CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ILLS.

3. ALONG WITH THE ABOVE, THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED NO INCLINATION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF TURKISH RESERVATIONS ABOUT MAKARIOS. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT MAKARIOS WOULD GO BACK TO NICOSIA, THE SOVIET PRESS WELCOMED THE ARCHBISHOP'S RETURN IN

GLOWING TERMS. PRAVDA CALLED IT AN EVENT OF GREAT POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND "A RESTORATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THE JULY 15 PUTSCH" (DECEMBER 8). THE PRESS HAS ALSO GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF FAVORABLE PUBLICITY TO MAKARIOS' STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TALKS WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, REFUSING A SETTLEMENT BASED ON POPULATION TRANSFERS (PRAVDA DECEMBER 8), DENYING ANY INTENTION OF ACTING AGAINST THE GREEK CYPRIOTS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OVERTHROW (IZVESTIYA DECEMBER 9), AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE DENKTASH-CLERIDES TALKS WOULD BEGIN AGAIN SOON (PRAVDA DECEMBER 11). BY CONTRAST THE SOVIETS' ONLY PUBLIC REFERENCE TO TURKISH VIEWS ABOUT MAKARIOS' RETURN (PRAVDA DECEMBER 3) REPORTED A TURKISH MFA SPOKESMAN AS SAYING THAT TALKS BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS WOULD BE SUSPENDED IF MAKARIOS CAME BACK.

4. TOGETHER WITH SYMPATHETIC TREATMENT OF MAKARIOS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT CAUSE, THE PRESS HAS ALSO WARMLY RECEIVED RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GREECE. FOLLOWING UP GENERALLY FAVORABLE COMMENT ON THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (WITH SOME BARBS EVIDENTLY MEANT TO ASSUAGE GREEK COMMUNIST SYMPATHIES), THE PRESS GREETED THE RESULTS OF THE GREEK REFERENDUM DECEMBER 8 WITH EXPECTED APPLAUSE. IT CHARACTERIZED THE REJECTION OF THE MONARCHY AS A BLOW TO THE CAMP OF REACTION AND A FURTHER STEP TOWARD THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC GAINS (NEW TIMES DECEMBER 13). KARAMANLIS' STATEMENT TO THE GREEK PARLIAMENT ALSO RECEIVED NEUTRAL-TO-POSITIVE COVERAGE. PRAVDA (DECEMBER 13) CARRIED A TASS REPORT STRESSING KARAMANLIS' COMMITMENT TO A NEW DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND FOCUSING ON HIS EXPRESSION OF INTENT TO PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. KARAMANLIS' REMARKS REGARDING GREEK COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE, HIS REFERENCES TO A REVIEW OF U.S. BASE RIGHTS, AND HIS EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN EXPANDED RELATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 19083 01 OF 02 271738Z

WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES EXPECTEDLY RECEIVED FAVORABLE NOTICE.

5. THE PRESS BALANCED THIS COVERAGE BY REPORTING CRITICAL COMMENT BY MAVROS AND PAPANDREOU (PRAVDA DECEMBER 14 AND 15). HOWEVER, CONSISTENT WITH THE POSITIVE TREATMENT OF KARAMANLIS, THE TASS REPORT ON FLORAKIS' SPEECH (PRAVDA DECEMBER 15) SCARCELY HINTED AT ANY COMMUNIST RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM. THE REPORT NOTED ONLY THAT FLORAKIS DISCUSSED THE "INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO CUT DOWN THE POWERS OF PARLIAMENT BY CREATING A POWERFUL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY," AND REPORTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT RECEIVED A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE WITHOUT INDICATING WHO VOTED AGAINST.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 19083 02 OF 02 271751Z

45

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 L-01 SP-02 INR-07 SAJ-01

SAM-01 PRS-01 PM-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00

RSC-01 /048 W

----- 000403

R 271525Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5724

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 19083

LIMDIS

6. THE ABOVE ORCHESTRATION, HARMONIZING BOWS TO MAKARIOS AND TO GREECE WITH A PERCEPTIBLE INCREASE IN IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF TURKEY'S LARGE PRESENCE ON CYPRUS AND INTRANSIGENT NEGOTIATING POSITION, APPEARS TO SIGNAL A SLIGHT TOUGHENING OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD ANKARA. MAKARIOS'S RETURN HAS OBVIOUSLY MADE IT HARDER FOR THE SOVIETS TO STAY ON THE FENCE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. BUT WE THINK THE SOVIET APPROVAL MAY ALSO REFLECT A REASSESSMENT OF TACTICS ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION.

7. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY CONSIDER THE UNCERTAIN POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY AND THE STRAINS BETWEEN ANKARA AND WASHINGTON OVER MILITARY AID AS A FACTOR ALLOWING SOMEWHAT MORE LATITUDE IN RELATIONS WITH THE TURKS. IN ADDITION, UNFAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL OPINION ABOUT TURKEY'S POSITION ON CYPRUS CAN ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO ENGAGE IN SOME MEASURED CRITICISM OF ANKARA WITHOUT PUTTING THEMSELVES AT THE FORE-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 19083 02 OF 02 271751Z

FRONT AMONG TURKEY'S CRITICS. THE SOVIETS ALMOST CERTAINLY ARE FRUSTRATED AT TURKEY'S LACK OF GRATITUDE FOR MOSCOW'S COMPARATIVELY EVEN-HANDED ATTITUDE. THEY WOULD LIKE TO BRING ANKARA AROUND TO A MORE SYMPATHETIC POSITION REGARDING THEIR SCHEMES TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT PROCESS. WE SUSPECT ALSO THAT MOSCOW'S CONCERN IS MOUNTING AT TURKEY'S LACK OF MOVEMENT TO REDUCE ITS FOCUS ON CYPRUS. THEY MUST BE WORRIED THAT THE DE FACTO PARTITION OF THE ISLAND MIGHT BECOME PERMANENT.

8. BY CONTRAST, GREECE'S MOVE TOWARD GREATER POLITICAL STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY UNDER KARAMANLIS IS NO DOUBT SEEN BY MOSCOW AS OFFERING GREATER OPPORTUNITIES TO WARM RELATIONS WITH ATHENS. THE SOVIETS WILL BE INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING GREECE'S SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THEIR INITIATIVE FOR A BROADER INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION ON THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT PROCESS. THEY WILL WANT TO ENCOURAGE GREECE TO CARRY THROUGH ON ITS STATED OBJECTIVE OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE. AND THEY WILL BE GENERALLY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING THEIR POSITION WITH THE GREEKS WHILE THE CURRENT CYPRUS SITUATION STILL MAKES A MOSCOW CONNECTION RELATIVELY ATTRACTIVE TO GREECE. THUS WE EXPECT TO SEE A GREATER SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH GREEK IDEAS REGARDING CYPRUS, AND SOME MOVEMENT BY THE SOVIETS TO EXPAND THEIR CONTACT WITH GREECE DURING THE MONTHS AHEAD.

9. ON CYPRUS ITSELF, MAKARIOS' RETURN ALSO APPEARS TO GIVE MOSCOW SOME GREATER FLEXIBILITY, ALTHOUGH HIS REEMERGENCE ON CENTER STAGE IS PROBABLY VIEWED AS A MIXED ASSET. MAKARIOS IS A KNOWN QUANTITY TO THE SOVIETS. ALTHOUGH HE MAY BE WEAKER NOW THAN HE WAS EARLIER, MOSCOW PROBABLY IS CONFIDENT THAT HIS PRESENCE OFFERS IMPORTANT INSURANCE AGAINST A SETTLEMENT ON THE ISLAND WHOLLY AT ODDS WITH SOVIET STATED INTERESTS. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT MAKARIOS' RETURN LIMITS SOVIET FLEXIBILITY IN TERMS OF WHAT THEY CAN SAY REGARDING A SETTLEMENT. THE ARCHBISHOP WILL EXPECT THE SOVIETS --IN VIEW OF THEIR ANNOUNCED SUPPORT FOR HIM--TO PUT THEIR MONEY WHERE THEIR MOUTH HAS BEEN.

10. AS WE SEE IT, THE SOVIET'S MAIN OBJECTIVE ON CYPRUS REMAINS A NEGATIVE ONE--TO PREVENT ANY PERMANENT PARTITION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 19083 02 OF 02 271751Z

OF THE ISLAND WHICH COULD ALLOW ALL OR PART OF IT TO FALL UNDER THE CONTROL OF GREECE OR TURKEY (AND NATO). THE SOVIETS

WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO EXPLORE ANY OPTION TO GET A GREATER SHARE OF THE ACTION REGARDING A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT EITHER THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH SOVIET PARTICIPATION (WHICH APPEARS A REMOTE POSSIBILITY) OR THROUGH THE UNSC. ON BOTH COUNTS, AND CONSISTENT WITH THEIR STRATEGY TOWARD GREECE AND TURKEY, IT APPEARS THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MAKARIOS WILL BE THE MAINSTAY OF SOVIET POLICY DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

11. FAILING A SETTLEMENT CONJENIAL TO SOVIET WISHES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE TOO UNHAPPY WITH A PROLONGATION OF THE CRISIS ON CYPRUS. A SITUATION OF CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY ON THE ISALND COULD ALLOW MOSCOW TO PURSUE ITS OBJECTIVES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AT A RELATIVELY LEISURELY PACE AND TO CULTIVATE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT GREATER INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE PROBLEM IS ESSENTIAL. A RENEWED OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE MIGHT BE SEEN IN MOSCOW AS PROVIDING SOME OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE THESE SOVIET OBJECTIVES, PROVIDED THE TURKS DID NOT USE THEIR SUPERIOR MILITARY FORCE TO EFFECT AN IRREVERSIBLE PARTITION OF THE ISLAND. NEW FIGHTING WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN AN OUTCRY AGAINST THE TURKS AND A FURTHER WEAKENING OF ANKARA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION. IN SUCH A CASE MOSCOW WOULD PROBABLY REPLAY HER SCENARIO OF LAST SUMMER WITH THE AIM OF SECURING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN A SETTLEMENT.

12. IN GROSS, THE CYPRUS PICTURE IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ACTIVISM. AT PRESENT THEIR PROSPECTS IN GREECE ARE BRIGHT, ALTHOUGH GREECE'S SPOILING ROLE IN NATO HAS PROBABLY NOT DEVELOPED AS WELL AS THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED. THE TURKISH CARD THEY PLAYED SO BOLDLY LAST SUMMER HAS FAILED TO WIN BACK MUCH MORE THAN THE ORIGINAL ANTE. MAKARIOS' RETURN APPEARS TO BE A PLUS FOR MOSCOW, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS MUST HAVE LITTLE HOPE THAT HE CAN DELIVER ON THE ISLAND'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY --THEIR MAJOR SETTLEMENT PRIORITY. FURTHERMORE, DETENTE CONSIDERATIONS PLACE A MAJOR RESTRAINT ON SOVIET ABILITY TO ALTER THIS SITUATION BY A MORE ACTIVIST PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA. THUS, WHILE WE EXPECT SOME SHIFTING AWAY FROM TURKEY AND GREATER OVERT SUPPORT FOR GREECE AND MAKARIOS, WE DOUBT THAT SOVIET DIPLOMACY OVER CYPRUS WILL EXCEED THE FAIRLY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 19083 02 OF 02 271751Z

LOWLEVEL OF TROUBLE-MAKING THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED IT SO FAR. WE EXPECT THAT MOSCOW WOULD EVEN FEEL COMPELLED TO ADJUST TO THE WORST OUTCOME FORM THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT--A GREEK-TURKISH ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT SOVIET PARTICIPATION AMOUNTING TO

DEFACTO PARTITION OF THAT UNHAPPY ISLAND.
STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ADOPTION, AGREEMENTS, UNGA RESOLUTIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: MorefiRH
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MOSCOW19083
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740376-0068
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t1974128/aaaaagli.tel
Line Count: 329
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 74 USUN 5966
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MorefiRH
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 MAY 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <31 DEC 2002 by MorefiRH>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE SOVIETS AND CYPRUS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, GR, CY, TU
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005